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THE NUSSEIBEH–AYALON PLAN:  
Common Ground or Quicksand? 
Peter Lippman 
 
The establishment of the state of Israel fifty-six years ago and the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 deprived the Palestinians of 
their self-determination.  The resulting ongoing struggle for the return of 
Palestinian refugees and for a homeland has been manifested in continuous 
violence and insecurity for both sides.  Over the past few decades, 
numerous “peace processes” have been launched and failed.  
With the advent of the new Intifada in the fall of 2000, and the 
subsequent arrival of hardliner Ariel Sharon as prime minister, Israel and 
Palestine have descended into the fiercest cycle of violence yet seen 
between the two adversaries.  The Oslo peace process, ostensibly the most 
promising attempt since the beginning of the occupation, is dead.  In its 
place several other schemes intended to bring the ongoing strife to an end 
have surfaced.  One of these is the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan,1 named after the 
Palestinian and Israeli figures who crafted it.  
The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan is bold and simple, expressed in one page of 
text that proposes, through significant compromises for both sides, to put 
the conflict to rest forever.  One of the plan’s strengths is that it foresees the 
resolution to sticky “final status” questions whose lack of resolution 
doomed the Oslo process.  The plan also proposes to go directly “to the 
people” for support, instead of being conducted entirely at an elite level.  
These two elements of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon approach could, if pursued 
sincerely, ensure a greater chance of success than that enjoyed by any 
previous peace process.  
However, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal has fatal defects that will 
prevent its acceptance by a great majorityof Palestinians whose fate it 
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purports to resolve.  Furthermore, the plan has been stillborn into an 
environment where far stronger forces have ensured that it is quickly 
marginalized.  
I.  PROBLEMS WITH NUSSEIBEH–AYALON 
At first glance, several elements of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal 
immediately stand out as problematic.  The most troublesome include: 
1. Recognition of Palestine as the only state of the Palestinian people and 
Israel as the only state of the Jewish people.  
This establishment of two ethnocracies goes against the several 
generations long trend of recognition that modern states cannot award 
citizenship rights to inhabitants solely on the basis of their ethnicity and 
expect to thrive in peace.  It also legalizes before the world, in 
contravention of all international human rights law, the discrimination 
against Palestinians—one fifth the Israeli population—now in practice in 
Israel.  
2. Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon on the 
basis of the June 4, 1967 lines. 
For a two-state solution to be successful, it will certainly have to involve 
Israel’s return to its 1967 borders.  Gaza is currently inhabited by 
approximately 7,000 Israeli settlers (alongside over one million 
Palestinians) who control over 20 percent of its land.  The West Bank, 
including Palestinian East Jerusalem, contains over 150 Israeli settlements 
dotted throughout the countryside.  A good faith withdrawal would send all 
the settlers who are not willing to become Palestinian citizens back to pre-
1967 Israel.  However, the third item of the proposal, covering the issue of 
Jerusalem, states:  
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3. Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian 
sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. 
It happens that vast sections of East Jerusalem, formerly 100 percent 
Palestinian and illegally annexed by Israel soon after the 1967 takeover, 
have been made into Israeli settlements.  These massive settlements, 
constantly stretching the geographic definition of Jerusalem, have grown to 
extend all the way to Bethlehem in the south, Ramallah in the north, and 
well into the West Bank to the east.  Thus granting Israeli sovereignty to 
these settlements automatically means the annexation to Israel of large parts 
of the West Bank.  Not only does this annexation truncate the future 
Palestinian state and severely disrupt Palestinian thoroughfare, it is also 
unrealistic to believe that any land of equal value on the current border 
between the West Bank and Israel could be found that would compensate 
for the loss of this territory.  
4. Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will 
return only to the State of Israel. 
For the Palestinians, this point is so objectionable that it cannot be taken 
seriously.  During the war that led to the establishment of the state of Israel 
in 1948, Israeli forces expelled over 800,000 Palestinians from their land, 
and destroyed at least 400 villages.  Over 300,000 Palestinians were further 
displaced during the 1967 war.  Today, these refugees and their descendents 
exceed four million, living in camps in the Occupied Territories, all the 
countries surrounding Israel, and in many other countries throughout the 
world.  They have not given up their dream of returning to their ancestral 
homeland.  
These are the most problematic points of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan, 
though not the only ones.  Altogether, the plan’s implementation requires 
the Palestinians to swallow their long-held hopes for repatriation without 
promising them a viable homeland in an intact West Bank and Gaza.  More 
likely, implementation of this plan would see a crowded, impoverished, and 
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under-developed Palestine subservient to its rich and powerful Israeli 
neighbor.  
Clearly, there are conflicting claims upon the land of “historic Palestine.”  
Israeli and Palestinian national myths and dreams clash, and it cannot be 
denied that both sides must make compromises.  In the eventual resolution 
of this conflict, strident calls for absolute justice will have to be left behind.  
But the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan, a reflection of the long-term power 
imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, does not afford the 
Palestinians a measure of justice sufficient to reassure them that they can 
look forward to self-determination and a healthy livelihood.  
II.  CONSULT THE REFUGEES 
The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan involves a process whereby masses of 
Israelis and Palestinians are encouraged to sign a petition in its support, 
which will thus translate into pressure on the Israeli government in favor of 
the plan’s implementation.  According to the plan’s drafters, by early Spring 
2004 activists had indeed collected over 300,000 signatures, around 40 
percent of them Palestinian.2  Promoters of the plan characterize this work 
as a way of consulting the grassroots of both peoples for support.  
However, at the same time the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan has met with a 
heated, angry response on the part of many Palestinians who resent its facile 
way of trading off their right to return.  This right is enshrined in the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 
1943 (whose implementation was intended to be a condition of Israel’s entry 
into the United Nations), and other significant international legal 
documents.  The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan constitutes an abrogation of these 
documents for all time.  
In the Fall of 2002, soon after the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal was first 
publicized, eighty Palestinian grassroots and refugee organizations in the 
Occupied Territories and surrounding countries released a statement 
condemning the proposal.  The statement reaffirmed the commitment of 
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Palestinians to their right to return and criticized the proposal for granting 
Israel impunity for its expulsion of the Palestinian population.  An official 
launching of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan in Ramallah was cancelled due to 
protests.  
The question of support for return is in fact a thorny one.  Given the time 
that has elapsed since the expulsions, some Palestinians have resettled 
comfortably—especially in Jordan, where they have acquired citizenship—
and will not be interested in uprooting themselves to return. Others—
especially in the impoverished camps of Lebanon, where discrimination has 
been the rule—will be quick to come back.  But regardless of circumstance, 
Palestinians have not renounced their rights en masse.  Whether or not 
individuals are prepared to return, they still wish for their rights to be 
recognized.  This is a basic requirement for the fulfillment of justice needed 
for Palestinians, from their side, to lay the conflict to rest.  
At present, assertions that “no Palestinians have relinquished the right of 
return,” countered by assertions that “only an insignificant number of 
Palestinians would move to Israel” constitute a fruitless rhetorical polemic, 
fueled more by passionate insistence than by fact.  It seems obvious that an 
open process of direct consultation with the mass of Palestinian refugees 
would go a long way towards shoring up one position or the other, and 
would as such be a helpful step in identifying a resolution to the conflict.  
Some work has been done in this direction, notably by Khalil Shikaki, 
director of the Palestinian center for Policy and Survey Research in 
Ramallah.  In 2003, Shikaki released findings from a survey of 4,500 
refugees living in the Occupied Territories, Jordan, and Lebanon.4  While 
over 95 percent insisted on Israel’s recognition of the right to return, 
Shikaki reported that over half of the respondents said that they would 
accept compensation or homes in a Palestinian state, and only around ten 
percent stated  that they would return to present-day Israel.  
The Palestine Liberation Organization’s Refugee Affairs Department 
contested these results, and a group of angry Palestinians attacked Shikaki’s 
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office and damaged it when he tried to make a public statement concerning 
his findings.  Shikaki’s evaluation of these events was that Palestinians 
interpreted his findings as a rejection of the right to return, even though he 
publicized his respondents’ clear desire for the recognition of that right.  
It is apparent that with regard to the question of refugee return, the basic 
principle of consultation has not been fulfilled. Thus, it seems clear that a 
wide-ranging survey to clarify the refugees’ wishes is in order.  This 
investigation should be led by the refugees themselves.  If the results lean 
towards return, the project should transform itself into a grassroots 
movement.  Only in this way will the voice of the refugees be heard.  That 
the millions of refugees are fragmented and under-represented is 
understandable, but only they can take matters into their own hands and 
change this situation.  
III.  NUSSEIBEH–AYALON PLAN FLESHED OUT:  
THE GENEVA ACCORDS 
If the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan is the skeleton, the forty-six page Geneva 
Accord5 is the flesh.  This unofficial initiative, hammered out by Israeli 
opposition figures together with officials from the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), gives life to the ideas presented by Nusseibeh and Ayalon.  Nusseibeh 
and Ayalon assert that their plan is different from the Geneva Accords, and 
potentially more rooted in the will of the people, by virtue of their petition 
campaign, as well as the fact that they have left the details of their plan to 
be determined by greater participation.  
However, the Geneva Accord, released in the fall of 2003, has so much in 
common with the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan that it should be taken as a 
faithful representation of the intent of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon project’s 
goals.  It is important to examine the Geneva Accord not only for this 
reason, but also because the Accord has captured the imagination of 
politicians and moderate opponents of the occupation worldwide.  In effect, 
it has piggy-backed on the momentum of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan.  
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Significant elements of the Geneva Accord include: restrictions against 
the return of Palestinian refugees to their pre-1948 homes;6 de-militarization 
of the new state of Palestine without a corresponding de-militarization of 
Israel;7 annexation of Israeli settlements8 (especially the large settlements 
around Jerusalem) with the unlikely promise of an equal land swap;9 and an 
ongoing Israeli and international military presence in Palestine.10  
Like the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal, the Geneva Accord undercuts the 
entire body of international law supporting the Palestinians’ right to refugee 
return and, in spite of its detail, makes no provision for an Israeli 
acknowledgment of its own responsibility in the decades-long suffering of 
the Palestinian people.  On the contrary, it frees Israel from this burden 
materially by leaving the number of Palestinian refugees allowed into Israel 
up to the discretion of the Israeli government.11 
IV.  “OSLO WARS” 
If one takes a closer look at developments in Israel and Palestine since 
the first Intifada, a common theme of intensification of the occupation 
becomes visible.  While moderate opponents of the occupation fervently 
believed that the 1993 Oslo agreement signaled peace between the two 
peoples and the end to the occupation, that “peace process” was in fact the 
front end of a continuum that finds its culmination in the initiatives of 
Nusseibeh–Ayalon and Geneva. 
The commonality between these three projects is their lack of concrete 
improvement for the Palestinians, which translates into the lack of a 
promise of peace for all parties.  Oslo promised much, but the thorniest 
problems have never been addressed.  After 1993, checkpoints and 
roadblocks proliferated throughout the Occupied Territories at a drastic rate, 
closures and other draconian restrictions on Palestinian rights skyrocketed, 
and illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank doubled their population 
within ten years. 
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Not only did the Israeli authorities (both Likud and Labor) demonstrate 
their long-term goals of unofficial annexation and their disregard for 
Palestinian self-determination quite clearly during the Oslo period, but the 
nature of the Palestinian Authority as a collaborationist organ also became 
obvious to those whom it governed.  This may come as news to those who 
have been persuaded that Yasser Arafat is the “head of all terrorists,” (as the 
current rhetoric of the Sharon government holds), but in fact Arafat and his 
colleagues, after they repatriated from Tunisia in 1993, formed a regime 
that did little more than subcontract the occupation on behalf of the Israelis.  
Euphoria reigned when Israeli troops left the centers of most Palestinian 
cities, but it did not take long for the Palestinians to realize that Israeli rule 
had been replaced by a very corrupt government that served, in many ways, 
as a proxy occupation. 
The Palestinian Authority has shown itself to be the embodiment of the 
impulse among a few Palestinians to make vast compromises with the 
Israelis, going against the interests of its own constituents.  These people 
agreed to the Oslo agreement even though it left all international borders 
with Palestine under the control of the Israeli government, gave Israel veto 
power over all decisions taken by the Palestinian government, and placed 
the better part of the West Bank (“area C”) under the complete control of 
the Israeli occupying force. 
The agreement also required the Palestinian Authority to police and 
repress its own subjects as they began to feel the increasing constriction 
from an occupation that had not withdrawn, but only redeployed.  To do so, 
the PA established a bewildering number of secret security forces, and 
Palestinians began to be incarcerated——even tortured, at times——in the 
same jails in which they had previously been mistreated by the Israeli 
authorities.  Needless to say, this proxy Palestinian enforcement of the 
Israeli government’s desires did not endear the PA to the Palestinian 
population, and one of the only things that has to a small extent repaired 
Common Ground or Quicksand?   455 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004 
Yasser Arafat’s esteem in the eyes of his subjects is the fact that the Israelis 
have incarcerated him in his Ramallah compound for several years. 
Sari Nusseibeh is president of Al Quds University in Jerusalem, and 
former Palestinian Authority political commissioner for East Jerusalem.  
Yasser Abed Rabbo, head of the Palestinian group that negotiated the 
Geneva Accords, is Arafat’s Minister of Information.  Thus both of these 
initiatives, from the Palestinian side, have been crafted by figures whose 
political stance can be interpreted as directly representative of the 
“cooperative” position of the PA. 
During a recent visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, I had 
occasion to listen to the presentation of a hard-line Israeli settler living in 
one of the small enclaves of Hebron.  I was startled when he referred to the 
current Intifada as the “Oslo War.”  His implication was that giving 
Palestinians hope for statehood gave them the audacity to rebel against the 
“rightful (Israeli) owners of the land.”  Upon reflection, I would have to 
accept the term, if not its racist implication.  The present Intifada is a 
rebellion against the deal made between the Palestinian elite and the Israeli 
government, and the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords are 
two new, if only theoretical, incarnations of that arrangement. 
When proponents of these schemes speak of “painful concessions for 
peace” on the part of the Palestinians, they are ingenuously acknowledging 
the fact that the Palestinians simply do not have the negotiating leverage to 
win justice for their cause.  At least, that is what the Palestinian elite 
believes, and its representatives seem to be satisfied with selling off 
Palestinian rights in return for a few villas and other ostentatious, but 
limited, emblems of power.  However, the Palestinian grassroots anti-
occupation movement has another kind of power, and it will continue to 
defy the occupation, and the manipulations of its own illegitimate leaders, 
persistently. 
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V.  EUPHORIA? 
There has been a strong contrast between the response to the Nusseibeh–
Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords in the Occupied Territories and in the 
West.  Other than the above-described reaction, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan 
did not make much of a splash in Palestine.  When the Geneva Accords 
were announced in the fall of 2003, they were met with vituperation by the 
mainstream Israeli press, which denounced Yossi Beilin (one of the chief 
Israeli drafters) as a “traitor.”  Meanwhile, around the West Bank my 
inquiries as to the value of the initiative were met, more or less, with a 
“huh?” response.  It was clear that Palestinians at home in the West Bank 
are much more preoccupied with issues such as the oncoming “Separation 
Wall,” which is steadily advancing through the olive groves of the West 
Bank and the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. 
As this Wall progresses, it increasingly separates Palestinian farmers 
from their cropland, urban families from their relatives, students from their 
schools, and merchants from their shops.  When the Wall is finished, the 
mass of Palestinians will be fenced off into ghettoes.  This specter, far more 
than the advent of yet another unpromising peace deal, is what is on the 
minds of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. 
Meanwhile, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and especially the Geneva 
Accords have been hailed as a breakthrough by moderate opponents of the 
occupation in the West.  Governments and mildly liberal peace activists 
alike have taken up the banner of Geneva as a “brave and encouraging 
solution” and as “proof that there is a negotiating partner” among the 
Palestinians.  Given the stark contrast between this hopefulness and the 
reality of the intensifying occupation, this euphoric response is reminiscent 
of a messianic movement, quite in denial of the facts. 
Community organizations promoting the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the 
Geneva Accords in the West tend to be top-heavy with supporters of Israel 
whose impulse for peace stems much more strongly from the desire for a 
“secure Israel” (with as few Palestinian citizens as possible) that retains the 
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vast (heretofore) illegal Israeli settlements, than from any great concern 
about equal justice for all. 
VI.  SIDESHOW 
In the end, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords have no 
prospects because their parent, the Oslo peace process, is long since dead.  
The militaristic option of corralling the Palestinians now reigns, and the 
softer approach of cooperation with a Palestinian collaborator regime has 
been discontinued.  However, the advent of the annexationist Wall also 
closes off the possibility of a two-state solution, and cements the 
accomplishment of the current single state that exists between the 
Mediterranean and the Jordan River. 
If it is not already so, soon the two-state option will be yet another peace 
fantasy.  Commentators and activists are increasingly turning their attention 
to the prospect of a single democratic state that allows both Palestinians and 
Israeli Jews to live in freedom, democracy, and tolerance.  At present this 
too is but a fantasy, but all political realities, pleasant or atrocious, start this 
way.  It is for the residents of the land to decide, eventually, how they can 
live together in a decent way.  A prerequisite for this future will be 
compromise.  But justice will also be a necessary ingredient. 
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